HILFE

Dawud Gholamasad

Die Lehren aus der Regierungskrise Frankreichs: Verfassungsimmanente Krisenpotenziale des Semipräsidialsystems

 

Frankreich hat bei den vorgezogenen Parlamentswahlen im Juli 2024 zwar mehrheitlich links gewählt, erhielt jedoch trotz massiver Proteste eine Mitte-Rechts-Regierung. Die Linke war zwar als stärkste Kraft aus der Parlamentswahl hervorgegangen, konnte jedoch keine eigene Mehrheit aufbauen, um einen Premierminister zu stellen. Daher sieht die Linke in Michel Barnier einen Regierungschef „von Le Pens Gnaden“ und wirft Präsident Macron einen „Staatsstreich“ vor. Denn auch die anderen politischen Lager konnten keine eigene Mehrheit erreichen.

Angesichts dieser Pattsituation und der fehlenden Koalitionskultur in Frankreich ernannte Präsident Macron den konservativen Ex-EU-Kommissar Michel Barnier zum Premierminister. Nachdem der rechtspopulistische „Rassemblement National“ von Marine Le Pen auf ein Misstrauensvotum gegen den neuen Premier verzichtete, entstand eine Mitte-Rechts-Regierung. Diese hielt jedoch nicht einmal drei Monate. Frankreich steckt nun wieder in einer Regierungskrise, sodass Präsident Macron erneut einen neuen Premierminister suchen muss.

Internationale Medien machen vor allem Emmanuel Macron für den Sturz der Regierung verantwortlich. Diese Personifizierung der Krise, die als Fehleinschätzung Macrons gedeutet wird, übersieht jedoch die verfassungsimmanenten Krisenpotenziale des semipräsidentiellen Regierungssystems Frankreichs.

Ein ähnliches Krisenpotenzial war bereits im Verfassungsentwurf der „Islamischen Republik Iran“ angelegt, der in vielen Aspekten dem französischen System nachempfunden war. Dem Entwurf wurde jedoch nachträglich die „absolute Schriftgelehrtenherrschaft“ hinzugefügt. Der Konflikt zwischen dem damaligen Präsidenten Khamenei und Ministerpräsident Mussavi war ein Resultat dieser Krisenpotenziale, der durch die Entscheidung des „charismatischen Führers“ Khomeini zugunsten Mussavis beigelegt wurde.

Aus diesen Beispielen lassen sich Lehren für die zukünftige Verfassungsnorm und Verfassungswirklichkeit des Iran nach dem Sturz der „Islamischen Republik“ ziehen.1 Diese Lehren betreffen insbesondere das semipräsidentielle Regierungssystem, das auch in Frankreich krisenanfällig ist:

Das semipräsidentielle System vereint Elemente des parlamentarischen und des präsidentiellen Regierungssystems. Die Regierung hängt sowohl vom Vertrauen des Staatspräsidenten ab als auch von der Mehrheit im Parlament. Daher kann man es auch als präsidial-parlamentarisches System bezeichnen.

1 Vergl. meine Diskussionsgrundlage der demokratischen Opposition: https://gholamasad.jimdofree.com/artikel/die-diskussionsgrundlage-einer-aktionseinheit-der-demokratischen-opposition/

2

Es ist eine Mischung beider Systeme: Wie im Präsidialsystem wird der Staatspräsident vom Volk gewählt und kann die Regierung bilden ohne Rücksicht auf die Zusammensetzung des Parlaments nehmen zu müssen. Dennoch muss er, wie in den USA, mit dem Parlament zusammenarbeiten, da dieses über die Gesetzgebung entscheidet. Im Gegensatz zum parlamentarischen System, wie etwa in Großbritannien oder Deutschland, hat der Präsident im semipräsidentiellen System nicht nur repräsentative Aufgaben. Er hat auch eine entscheidende Rolle bei der Regierungsbildung. So wird der Premierminister in Frankreich vom Präsidenten ernannt, kann jedoch durch ein Misstrauensvotum der Nationalversammlung gestürzt werden. Die Regierung ist also vom Vertrauen beider Instanzen abhängig. Der Präsident hat dabei gegenüber der Regierung einen erheblichen Einfluss, da er an der Spitze der Exekutive steht.

Diese Kombination macht das semipräsidentielle System anfälliger für Krisen als die beiden anderen Systeme, da es nicht nur von der schriftlichen Verfassung abhängt, sondern auch von der Verfassungswirklichkeit und den politischen Gepflogenheiten. So schreibt die Verfassung in der Regel vor, dass der Präsident die Regierungsmitglieder ernennt, diese jedoch vom Parlament bestätigt werden müssen. Auch kann das Parlament die Regierung stürzen. In einem semipräsidentiellen System kann es daher in der Praxis durchaus zu einer parlamentarischen Regierungspraxis kommen, da der Präsident in der Regel niemanden ernennt, der das Vertrauen des Parlaments nicht besitzt. Probleme entstehen jedoch, wenn keine Fraktion im Parlament über eine ausreichende Mehrheit verfügt und keine Koalitionsbereitschaft besteht.

Die Verfassungswirklichkeit hängt stark davon ab, ob der Präsident und die Parlamentsmehrheit dem gleichen politischen Lager angehören oder ob eine Koalition ihn unterstützt. In solchen Fällen ist der Präsident der klare politische Führer, der den Regierungschef auswählt. Dabei muss er jedoch auch die Wünsche der im Parlament unterstützenden Parteien berücksichtigen.

Im Extremfall kann der Präsident gezwungen sein, eine „Cohabitation“ – das schwierige Zusammenleben der beiden politischen Lager – zu akzeptieren, wenn er politisch realistisch ist. Ein solcher Fall trat erstmals 1986 ein, als der sozialistische Präsident François Mitterrand aufgrund einer Mehrheit der Liberalen und Konservativen im Parlament den Konservativen Jacques Chirac zum Premierminister ernannte. In der Außenpolitik konnte der Präsident jedoch weiterhin eigene Akzente setzen. Eine „Cohabitation“ gab es noch in den Jahren 1993-1995 und 1997-2002.

Gerade anhand der aktuellen Krise in Frankreich wird jedoch die systemimmanente Krisenanfälligkeit des semipräsidentiellen Systems deutlich. Es ermöglicht keine beständige und klar unterscheidbare Regierungspraxis zwischen parlamentarischem und präsidentiellem System. Vielmehr wechseln sich Phasen einer präsidentiellen Regierungspraxis – bei politischer Übereinstimmung zwischen Präsidenten und Parlamentsmehrheit – und Phasen einer parlamentarischen Regierungspraxis während der Cohabitation ab. Die zunehmende Polarisierung in Frankreich und die zunehmende Lagermentalität erschweren ein „Zusammenleben“ der politischen Lager zunehmend.

Hannover, 11.12.2024

There is no democracy without a deep respect for democratic values ​​and institutions

 

 

"My compatriots!

 

The reason I am speaking with you today is to begin a dialogue to present a "new treaty" that is in response to your myriad messages that you are rightly concerned about the present and future of Iran and that you know that the continuation of Islamic rule has an even darker future every day."

 

(Reza Pahlavi)

 

On September 28, 2020, Reza Pahlavi, the late Shah's son, announced a "New Covenant" in response to the alleged countless desperate inquiries from those concerned about present-day Iran and its future. However, he emphasizes that this "new covenant" does not manifest his ambition for power but is "an attempt to establish a system whose power does not lie in the monopoly of an individual or a group."

 

There were not only various critical objections but also approvals. In this article, I would like to take a brief, critical look at the support for presenting the "new treaty." Because his seemingly noble intention, in which the undercover claim to leadership of the "prince" manifests, means he is a practically ignoring the existing political-organization. This direct addressing of the Iranian people in the name of democracy virtually negates the opposition parties' existence as essential components of democracy in Iran. In his current powerlessness, Reza Pahlavi acts in a line of the tradition of suppressing the parties in pre-revolutionary Iran, which was justified in the name of "modernization." The dissolution of the two existing loyal parties and the creation of the Unity Party of the "National Resurrection" (Restakhiz) was the last such act before the revolution, Islamized under the leadership of Khomeini.

 

The criticism expressed here of the inability to learn of some leader-oriented oppositionists should be an invitation to remember the experiences already made with ideologically differently oriented personal leaders and align one's own democratic behavior accordingly. In this case, the parties' role in a parliamentary democracy should not be underestimated, however weak they may be; because one of the essential democratic institutions are political parties.

 

On the relevance of political parties in a democracy

 

A pluralistic party landscape connected with free elections is usually seen as essential for a representative democratic system. Party democracy is formed from this, in which political parties play a decisive role in political decisions. The decision-making processes may be lengthy and slow-moving; they are based on the party representatives' patience and foresight that must necessarily be shown.

 

Therefore in a democratic system, the parties are not just decisive as representatives of interests within a more comprehensive political association striving for as much political participation to achieve their objective or ideal goals. But also because they are, like the trade unions and other interest groups, democratic regulatory factors. Their function of order results from the fact that they represent differently organized associations of people who try to achieve their goals in peaceful competition with others. But by managing the representation of interests, they prevent both anarchic and populist forms of competition and elimination struggles between interested parties.

 

Political parties are also not just representatives of interests and democratic regulatory factors, but an organized form of transformation of political experiences making the permanent rule by personally "experienced" leaders superfluous. That is why exercising political power includes filling management positions in state and other institutions with party members or people close to the party with specialist skills. However, with this privilege, a new aristocracy emerges, the party aristocracy, which replaces the older one. No wonder the ancient aristocrats oppose their replacement. The persecution and suppression of the parties express these competitive and elimination battles, legitimized differently depending on historical circumstances. This legitimacy is essential because it has to justify the rule of the winners of these eliminations. A necessary aspect of this legitimation is the transfiguration of special interests as general interests.

 

The logic of "the end justifies every means" as a lagging effect of social habitus.

 

Therefore, the suppression of the parties and persecution of their potential or actual leaders is no exception in Iran since the "constitutional revolution." It is and remains a formative part of the Iranians' collective memory, even if the eternally Conservatives demand collective amnesia as a necessary condition for the unification of the opposition to the hierarchy in Iran. They never tire of justifying the bloody suppression by the Pahlavi dynasty with "their" modernization efforts. So they still confuse the logic of correlating events with the logic of their causal relationships. However, a "logic of correlation" only describes an association or correlation of two or more characteristics, states, or functions that do not necessarily have a causal relationship.

 

"Correlation implies causation" is a questionable cause logical fallacy

 

In statistics, the phrase "correlation does not imply causation" refers to the inability to legitimately deduce a cause-and-effect relationship between two variables solely based on an observed association or correlation between them. The idea that "correlation implies causation" is an example of a questionable cause logical fallacy, in which two events occurring together are taken to have established a cause-and-effect relationship.

 

With this confusion of the "logic of the correlation" of historical events with their socio- and psychogenesis, the bloody dictatorship of Reza Shah and that of his son appear to be justified as a "necessary evil" for the modernization of Iran. This cognitive distortion of reality suppresses the fact that even this problematic, growth-oriented modernization was an overall achievement of all Iranians despite the Pahlavis' dictatorships - not because of their "enlightened dictatorship." By appropriating the Iranians' collective efforts for the dictatorships, they also justify party democracy's suppression with the logic "the end justifies every means."

 

To the logic of "the end justifies every means" is lagging-behind-effect of the social habitus in the democratization process

 

This habit of thinking, confusing the "logic of the correlation" of the events with the "logic of their causal connections," and the associated logic of the ends-means-relation is an implicit logic, i.e., one that mainly unconsciously determines the behavior and decisions of some opposition members. Despite the recent bloody experiences of Khomeinism, this cognitive distortion of reality is still not wholly overcome. This assumption is supported by the vocal support of some members of the opposition in favor of the proclamation of the "New Covenant" by Reza Pahlavi, which they glorify like "national capital." They overlook the fact that they make him "the invaluable leader" of the nation, as the masses previously gave Khomeini the leader's charisma.

 

From the outside perspective, it is not difficult to understand why they sit in a ship and believe, with its captain, that he is, actually, the originator of the waves that carry their boat. They do not reflect that in their desperation, they are forced to overcome their "cognitive dissonance" in this way as long as they cultivate an ambivalent relationship to democracy. This conflicting emotional state in the democratization process, which is perceived as unpleasant, arises from the fact that they have still not overcome their previous anti-democratic tendencies in perceiving, remembering, thinking, and judging. The transformation of their lagging perceptions, thoughts, opinions, attitudes, desires, and intentions is essential if they want to overcome the existing undemocratic conditions. Otherwise, the dragging mental events going hand in hand with an assessment of the unbearable situation would drive them to such desperate acts again and again. They experience the unbearable barbarism of the regime and feel powerless in the face of the opposition's current organizational state that they welcome every savior. In this situation, their decision and behavior are controlled by the older layers of their social habitus without being aware of it.

 

As the psychologist and concentration camp survivor Viktor Frankl theorized, the experiences of the survivors of the Auschwitz concentration camp could, for example, be stimulating and pioneering for a necessary self-change in the face of unchangeable conditions. This change includes the insight that there is no democracy without democrats, but there are many democrats without democracy. Uniting them is the main task of the democratic opposition in Iran at the moment. However, everyone who wants to know now knows that the continued existence of theocratic totalitarianism in Iran is due to the lack of political alternatives. The regime has acted so ruinously in various areas that it can only maintain itself by force, given the increasing legitimacy loss. The experiences of the bloody suppression of the "green movement" in 2009, therefore, not only manifest the intransigence of the authorities in Iran in the face of democratic demands. They also confirm the low level of organization of the opposition as a condition for the possibility of the regime's survival despite its considerable loss of legitimacy, manifested in recent mass surveys. This lag in the self-organization of the democratic opposition in Iran is not only due to the brutal suppression of any opposition movement. Because the Iranians abroad are not directly exposed to life-threatening danger. These include specific habitus problems that the democratic opposition members abroad have fortunately got a grip on in the meantime.

 

Regardless of this, socio- and psychogenetic problems cannot be solved through the personal intervention of "influential personalities" by projecting extraordinary abilities on them. This attitude would sound just as absurd as if one were to declare money to be the cause of commodity production and commodity circulation. The fact that money can even be replaced by Bitcoin and the exchange of the goods can even be carried out cashless shows the absurdity of such an assumption – like one "personality" could integrate millions of people into one nation. This assumption would turn the origin and function of money upside down - as if the fetish character of money as the medium of exchange and money capital has caused the merchandise economy, although, precisely the other way around, money as a social construction is a function of the production and exchange of goods.

 

In an article that will follow soon, I will show why the democratic integration of increasingly individualized societies in the sense of integrating people as citizens is only possible through a common language as a means of communication, orientation, and control. This fact becomes clear when one considers that learned emotions and conscience as binding agents can only be linguistically symbolized and mentally represented.

 

In this sense, one can try to explain the organizational problems of the democratic opposition sociologically. Since the different degrees of organization manifests the existing balance of power in favor of the regime as a guarantee of its survival, the question arises about the socio- and psychogenetic aspects of the organizational problems of the democratic opposition. Because an effective organization of the democratic opposition is an indispensable source of power if the democrats' will to shape continues to exist, consequently, an appropriate diagnosis of this problem could be the first step in overcoming the democratic opposition's existing fragmentation. In an article from 2013, I tried to explain briefly why this fragmentation and division of the democratic opposition members due to their lack of consensus is a lagging effect of the democratization of the social habitus of the opposition. Overcoming this habitus problem is an indispensable prerequisite for efficient opposition's effective organization, not ignoring and symbolically destroying the future party democracy's delicate plants in Iran.

 

 

Hanover, October 14, 2020