In this text, I do not want to deal with the legal basis of the state terror of the USA in the name of combatting terrorism. Needless to say, how this act of violence reminds us that, as modernized barbarians, we still cultivate violence as a regulatory principle of interpersonal relationships in the name of civilization. The “arrogance of power” easily ignores the other side of the logic of emotions. This inevitably mobilizes unintentional consequences with the violation of the pain threshold of people, as we experience in massively mobilized dismay of the mourners in Iran - because "more power" does not always equate with "more value". Even the painful experience of one's own “power deficit” is not always experienced as “less self- value”. The experienced violation of one's own self-worth has a limit, the exceeding of which triggers at least the powerless rage. This can be no less aggressive and sometimes destructive - even if it manifests itself as a mass mourning demonstration of Islamic-molded people.

Therefore, for historical reasons, ritualized mourning is an indispensable characteristic of Shiism. There are many occasions for this, mainly referring to the murder of their "holy leaders" - as objects of their common identifying. But at the same time, it expresses their “inability to grieve”. After about 1,400 years, they are still unable to process the loss of their hegemonic supremacy as "Shia Ali", i.e. of the "partisan Ali", whom they see as the legitimate successor of Prophet Mohammed. The “principle of hope” therefore manifests itself for them in the form of a Shiite chiliasm, which is the expected creation of heavenly feelings on earth. The Twelve Shia clergy, therefore, sees itself as the representative of the last hidden 12th Imam, whose appearance they await in the sense of Shiite chiliasm. Shiite Islamism differs in its chiliastic activism, which, in contrast to "Shiite quietism", no longer wants to wait, but rather wants to actively fight for its appearance. They no longer passively expect the creation of heavenly feelings on earth when the hidden 12th Imam appears. Only by fighting for his return, do they think they can overcome their traumatic loss experience. In the meantime they believe with Khomeini that the hierocracy as a guarantor of the practical implementation of Sharia law will combat the anomie, i.e. "irregularity" and thus "anarchy" without ever losing sight of the final chiliastic goal.

The traumatic loss experience as “Partisan Ali”, which has still not been overcome, and the resulting religiously felt chiliastic duty therefore not only constitute their permanent hostility towards the Sunnis as usurpers and suppressors which the clergy has cultivated for centuries. It has also become a nativist sting for resistance to "Westernization" and struggle for its own hegemonic claims, given the hegemonic claims of the “unbeliever Western". This hegemony, the Islamist clergy are willing to enforce not only regionally but also globally. The death of Qassem Soleimani, who embodied these aspirations, is to be understood in this tradition.

Why do the masses identify with the "general" whose death they want to avenge?

After the assassination of Qassem Soleimani by a US drone attack in Baghdad, a three-day state mourning was declared and celebrated by mass mobilizations through the state. This was not only intended to demonstrate externally a mood caused by the loss of a person who was venerated personally; but also an emotional state of collective insult to the mass crying out for revenge.

However, it would be superficial to put the intentions of clerical rule and their 14 century old practice in masterfully emotional mobilization of the masses on given occasions in the foreground of the discussion. This would not explain the motivation of the mass of people who voluntarily participated in the funeral procession. It is clear that, given its sheer desperation after the growing legitimacy crisis of its rule, the hierocracy is grateful for such a system stabilizing "martyrdom" after the bloody suppression of the mass uprisings in Iran recently. After this massive legitimacy crisis, they have longed for such an external threat. Indeed, they have provoked an aggressive response from the United States for the demonstrative emphasis on the external danger by using countless proxy attacks. But they had not expected such a blow. This attack by Donald Trump was unpredictable even in his current situation, given the impending "impeachment inquiry" and his electoral considerations, which were aimed at avoiding war. It is therefore self-evident that the clerical rule in Iran - like Khomeini in the facing Saddam's war aggression - sees this as "God's blessing" and orchestrates it for system stabilization.

However, anyone who believes to have solved the problem with the "Islamic Republic" through such individual actions and eliminating of one its leaders does not understand the origination context of such more or less replaceable leaders. According to the characteristics of this expansive regime, for them the maintenance of which is an absolute priority, their struggle seems unstoppable after such a loss. It will be continued even with further determination "until the reign of the 12th Imam is established" - as Soleimani's successor said, who like his predecessor defiantly strives for Shiite world domination.

Anyone who wants to understand this determination and the dynamic that drives it must explain the mass participation of people in such state-ordered funeral ceremonies; even shortly after the bloody suppression of the mass protest demonstrations, in the course of which approximately 1,500 people were deliberately shot to death, hundreds injured and more than 7,000 people arrested. After that, even for the fear of further ritual mass mobilizations, any funeral service was banned for the murdered. It is therefore astonishing that these official funeral ceremonies apparently were attended not only by people loyal to the regime, but also by people who, according to their own statements, even want to boycott the upcoming parliamentary elections in protest. Why do they mourn despite their opposition to the regime?

As with any grief process, the grief demonstrated has an emotional aspect that needs to be understood in addition to the behavioral aspect. It is about coping with and processing their emotional pain. This was apparently triggered by the loss of a revered person. The question is, why is this man worshiped?

This would be partly understandable when one takes into account, that he was officially propagated as a distinguished general. He always was highlighted as a heroic fighter, who was fighting his entire life on different fronts. Whereas, the proxy war in Iraq and Syria was officially propagated as a defensive war against the IS and was seen by some Iranians as such. In this sense and in accordance with the state propaganda, Soleimani was seen as the main force to prevent the IS to invade Iran.

As a matter of fact, Soleimani stands for the splendor and glory of the "Shiite front" in the Middle East in a struggle for world domination that is to continue until the arrival of the 12th Imam, as his successor expressly emphasizes. It goes without saying that the "Islamic Republic" must inevitably respond at least symbolically to the attack on the symbol of its own glory and honor. But why do the masses of people identify with this violent person who is jointly responsible for hundreds of thousands of deaths and displacement of millions of people in Syria alone. A person, who went to the absolute extreme for the maintenance and expansion of the hierocracy in Iran, by killing indiscriminately peaceful protesters by snipers, and who has mandated and practiced the same as a recipe for success in Syria and Iraq as well.

The mass behavior could apparently confirm Khomeini's idea of their nativism, in the sense of demonstratively emphasizing the values defined as their own. This view was also expressed in his message when the resolution to end the war against Saddam was adopted: „The Iranian people have shown that they can endure hunger and thirst, but not defeat the revolution and attack against its principles. Our beloved nation, the true and genuine fighters of Islamic values, has recognized that the struggle is incompatible with the pursuit of welfare ...”

Should this mean that the value structure of Iranians has not changed since the "Islamic Revolution"? Is really the collective self-worth relationship for the grieving Iranians, i.e. their collective pride still more important than their civil liberties as citizens, which have been brutally suppressed for 40 years? Is Shiite Islamism their self-esteem scheme? Are they really "proud Shiites" seeking global supremacy, like the Islamist clergy with their group-charismatic aspirations that lead them? Are they unable to distinguish between their healthy "love of the fatherland" and a tendency of Shia Islamism striving for hegemonic power? Do they actually share the hegemonic frenzy of the Islamists, who declare and keep them immature? In other words: Why do they identify themselves with such a military leader, whose top priority was unconditional adherence to the "leader"? Or has their valence figuration, the figuration of their affective bonds shifted again in favor of their nativism for a given occasion?

In order to understand why the attack on Soleimani has shifted the aversion from the regime in the course of the protests in favor of a defensive attitude against an external enemy, the character of the state as an attack and defense unit must be taken into account as well. It originates from common affective bonds of the people to their collective symbols. As such, the "Islamic Republic" arose through the joint affective attachment of the revolutionary masses to Khomeini, who, as a charismatic leader, determined their fate until his death. However, with the routinization of the charismatic rule after his death this ambivalence and thus the disputes over the state character intensified. While the majority of the recently bloodily oppressed demonstrators see the state as a defensive unit, the clerical rule sees it as an attack unit.

This contradicting character of the post revolutionary state originated from a chiliastic shaped nativist revolution, on which the clergy was able to put its stamp on due to its hegemonic position as the best-organized opposition forces at that time. It manifested itself in the "Islamic Republic", which could be neither Islamic nor Republican. This manifests itself in the absolute priority of maintaining hierocracy, emphasized since Khomeini, even at the expense of temporarily suspending the primary commandments of Islam.

Since then, the permanent struggles have been about overcoming this immanent contradiction of the state in favor of its 'Islamic' or 'Republican' aspect. With the Republican character, the defense character of the state will become more dominant. The last bloody suppressed protest demonstrations therefore aimed at an unmistakable redefinition of the state character as a defense unit, as manifested by its central slogans against the external interference of the "Islamic Republic".

The killing of Soleimani ordered by Trump, therefore, provided invaluable services to the regime in Tehran by re-energizing this shift in the balance between the state's attack and defense characteristic temporarily in favor of the former. The mass mourning provided an emotional basis for this shift in balance in favor of the clerical rule, which could repurpose the resulting collective injury to people for the own benefit. With it the attack character of the „Islamic Republic” was strengthened again. That is why people have now been arrested for „insulting General Soleimani“, and are to be tried for "insulting the sanctities" – thanks to Trump!

This article is a translation from German: Iran: Zur Logik der Emotionen der Trauenden um den „General vom 8.01.2020